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FACULTY COMMENT
Old Jerusalem: Whose to Govern?
JOHN QUIGLEY*
When the United Nations Security Council criticized Israel in 1990
over shootings by Israeli police in east Jerusalem, Israel rejected the con-
demnation, replying that east Jerusalem was Israeli territory, and there-
fore the Council had no authority to concern itself. Israel refused to re-
ceive investigators the U.N. Secretary-General wanted to send to inquire
into the incident.'
Also in 1990, Soviet Jews immigrated to Israel in substantial num-
bers, and many settled in east Jerusalem. The city's Palestine Arabs pro-
tested, fearing a further solidification of Israel's control. The United
States protested on similar grounds. Israel took the position that it could
settle immigrants in east Jerusalem. 2
In 1991, when the United States pressed Israel to negotiate with the
Palestinians, Israel said it would not talk with Palestinian residents in
Jerusalem. Israel feared that talks with Jerusalem Palestinians about a
territorial settlement might imply that Israel did not have full sover-
eignty over Jerusalem.3
These controversies highlight the long-standing dispute over the sta-
tus of east Jerusalem. The government of Israel views it as Israeli terri-
tory. Under Israeli law, east Jerusalem is part of a larger Jerusalem and is
Israel's capital city. The Palestine Liberation Organization, on the other
hand, holds that east Jerusalem should be the capital of a Palestinian
state. The U.N. Security Council considers east Jerusalem to be territory
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University. LL.B., M.A., Harvard University. The au-
thor is grateful to Atty. Usama Halabi for comments on a draft of this article.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 78-81.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 71-77. "East Jerusalem" as used in this article
means the ancient walled city containing numerous holy sites, plus the surrounding area to
the north, south, and east, within borders defined by a regulation of the Israeli government,
see infra notes 54-56. It was territory under Jordanian control 1948-67. "West Jerusalem" is
the area to the west of the ancient walled city. It has been under Israel's control since 1948.
3. Thomas L. Friedman, Mideast Talks: Peace Might Be an Incidental Result, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 1991, at A8, col. 3.
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under Israel's belligerent occupation, and therefore subject to its scrutiny.
This article examines the legal status of east Jerusalem to determine
whether the United Nations may concern itself with Israel's conduct
there, and whether Israel may lawfully settle immigrants there. It also
examines the question of sovereignty in east Jerusalem, to sort out the
conflicting claims, and to determine who has the right to govern.4
I. HISTORICAL CONNECTIONS IN JERUSALEM
To answer these questions, it is necessary first to review the city's
history and the contending parties' connections to it. A key element in
any claim to territory is occupation. A state or people that can establish
its occupation, to a greater degree than others, will be deemed, at least
prima facie, the legitimate sovereign.' In the face of competing claims to
Western Sahara, the International Court of Justice used effectiveness of
occupation to resolve the question of sovereignty. The Court analyzed
acts of occupation and dominion by the contending parties and found
that the indigenous inhabitants had the strongest claim, based on long-
time occupation. Morocco, which also claimed sovereignty, had played a
certain role, but its acts of dominion, said the Court, were less
significant.6
With Jerusalem too, an analysis of sovereignty must begin with occu-
pation. Jerusalem historically has been a part of Palestine, and thus the
question of occupation and control of Jerusalem must be considered in
that context. Early in the second millennium B.C. it was a city of the
Jebusites, a sub-group of the Canaanites, the earliest recorded inhabi-
tants in Palestine. It was first conquered by the Israelites around 1000
B.C. and became the capital of the Kingdom of Judah. It was later con-
quered by the Babylonians in 587 B.C., and subsequently ruled by others
until Arabs from the Arabian Peninsula conquered Palestine in the sev-
enth century A.D.. During this time, the bulk of the population remained
the Canaanites.8
With the Arab conquest, the Canaanites took on the Arabic language,
and most assumed its religion, Islam. Since that time they have been re-
4. This article does not examine legal rights to territory other than east Jerusalem. The
author examines rights in all of historic Palestine in JOHN QUIGLEY, PALESTINE AND ISRAEL: A
CHALLENGE TO JUSTICE (1990).
5. R.Y. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 16-35 (1963);
Minquiers and Ecrehos case (France v. U. K.), 1953 I.C.J. 57.
6. Western Sahara (adv. op.), 1975 I.C.J. 3, 40-68. See also Island of Palmas, 2 U.N.
REP. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 829 (1928) (In a dispute between the Netherlands and the United
States over sovereignty in certain Pacific Ocean Islands, an arbiter relied on Dutch East
India Company agreements with local princes relating to the islands as more significant
than a United States claim that its predecessor in interest, Spain, had discovered them. The
arbiter found title in the Netherlands because of its greater exertion of control).
7. Judges 19:10-12.
8. HENRY CATTAN, JERUSALEM 21-24 (1981).
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ferred to as Arabs.' In the sixteenth century the Ottoman Empire con-
quered Palestine, and the area around Jerusalem became an Ottoman ad-
ministrative district. Still the Arabized Canaanites formed the bulk of the
population, along with a Jewish minority that remained from ancient
times, numbering about two percent."0 In the late nineteenth century,
Jews migrated to Palestine from Europe, augmenting the Jewish minority
to nearly ten percent by the end of the century. A large number of these
lived in Jerusalem where they numbered half the population."
After World War I, Great Britain assumed control of Palestine,
which for the first time became a separate territorial entity, with Jerusa-
lem as its administrative center. Britain permitted migration by Euro-
pean Jews, and by World War II they numbered thirty percent of Pales-
tine's population against seventy percent Arabs. In Jerusalem, Jews
numbered over half, although Arabs owned more land. 2
In November 1947, in a resolution favored by the European states
but opposed by most Third World states, the United Nations General
Assembly recommended dividing Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish
state with an economic union between them. Jerusalem would have be-
come a corpus separatum under the U.N. Trusteeship Council, because of
sites in the Jerusalem-Bethlehem area considered sacred in Judaism, Is-
lam, and Christianity.'3 The resolution as a whole was protested by the
Palestine Arabs, who staged public demonstrations and a commercial
strike. They considered it unfair to split a country in which they were a
seventy percent majority. The General Assembly's plan, moreover, would
have given the thirty percent Jewish population over half the territory.
In December 1947, intercommunal hostilities broke out. Palestine
Arab irregulars attacked convoys carrying supplies to Jewish settlements,
and Jewish military units attacked Arab towns. The Jewish Agency,
which represented Palestine's Jewish population at the U.N., had a regu-
9. See Arnold Toynbee, The Middle East, Past and Present, in THE ARAB-ISRAELI
IMPASSE 41, 48 (Majdia D. Khadduri, ed., 1968) (states that by World War II, "the Palestin-
ian Arabs had been the inhabitants of Palestine for more than 1,300 years," refers to the
time of the Arab conquest of Palestine, and states that this tenure gave them "a prescriptive
right").
10. Shmuel Ettinger, The Growth of the Jewish Centre in Palestine Before the British
Occupation, in A HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE, at 915, 916 (Ben-Sasson ed., 1976). See
Julius Stone, Peace and the Palestinians, 3 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 247, 249-250 (1970)
(stating, incorrectly, that Palestine under Arab and Turkish rule "was never exclusively
Arab or Moslem anymore than it was exclusively Jewish or Christian, either in population or
in cultural and religious concerns").
11. Ettinger, supra note 10, at 916-917.
12. Supplement to the Survey of Palestine 13 (Government Printer, Jerusalem, 1947)
(giving as estimates for Dec. 31, 1946, in Jerusalem, 99,000 Jews and 65,000 Arabs). CATTAN,
supra note 8, at 158 (map of Jerusalem in 1948 showing Arab and Jewish districts). See
Stone, supra note 10, at 255 (arguing, incorrectly, that "no identifiable people now survives
which can demonstrate any special relation to Palestine prior to the centuries for Jewish
statehood there.").
13. G.A. Res. 181, 2 U.N. GAOR Res. 131, pt. 3, U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947).
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lar army, the Haganah. Other groups seeking Jewish statehood in Pales-
tine had smaller armed contingents. Jerusalem was a prime target of an
offensive undertaken in December by one of these, the Irgun. Irgun leader
Menachem Begin, who later became prime minister of Israel, described
how "for three days, from 11th to 13th December [1947]," the Irgun
"hammered at concentrations of rioters and their offensive bases," by
which he meant Arab villages. Begin recounted, "We attacked again and
again in Jerusalem." 4
On January 5, 1948, the Haganah set a bomb in the Semiramis Hotel
in an Arab district of west Jerusalem, killing twenty-six persons. The
Haganah said in justification that it had information that the hotel
housed Arab irregulars. The British government, disputing that informa-
tion, denounced the Semiramis bombing as terrorist and a "dastardly and
wholesale murder of innocent people."15
During January and February, under the pressure of the Haganah-
Irgun attacks, Palestine Arabs fled from many areas of Palestine, includ-
ing Jerusalem. On February 5, 1948, David Ben-Gurion, who would be-
come Israel's first prime minister, ordered that Jews be settled in con-
quered and abandoned Arab areas. The Haganah rocketed Arab
neighborhoods in Jerusalem, with the apparent aim of frightening Arab
residents into fleeing, and many did.16
In a February 7 speech, Ben-Gurion said, "Since Jerusalem's destruc-
tion in the days of the Romans, it hasn't been so Jewish as it is now." In
"many Arab districts" in the western part of Jerusalem, he said, "one sees
not one Arab. I do not assume that this will change. 1 7 On February 12,
after a Jewish woman was shot in the Talbiyeh district of west Jerusalem,
a Haganah loudspeaker van drove through the neighborhood ordering the
Arab residents to evacuate.1 8
In April 1948, combatants of the Irgun and the Stern Gang (LEHI),
another Jewish military force, captured the village of Deir Yassin just
west of Jerusalem, and killed 250 of its civilian inhabitants. The Irgun
claimed that it killed the inhabitants while taking houses by force, but
witnesses said that it killed them after the fighting ended.'9 The Irgun
drove surviving Deir Yassin inhabitants in trucks through Jerusalem as a
14. MENACHEM BEGIN, THE REVOLT 337 (1951). In late January 1948, the Irgun Com-
mand selected four major Palestine Arab population centers as targets for a spring offensive:
Jerusalem, Jaffa, the Lydda-Ramleh plain, and the Triangle. Id. at 348. These were four
major Arab population centers in Palestine.
15. Sam Pope Brewer, Britain Condemns Haganah 'Murders,' N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
1948, at Al, col. 2.
16. BENNY MORRIS, THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM, 1947-1949 50-52
(1987).
17. TOM SEGEV, 1949: THE FIRST ISRAELIS 25 (1986); MORRIS, supra note 16, at 52.
18. MORRIS, supra note 16, at 52.
19. Dana Adams Schmidt, 200 Arabs Killed, Stronghold Taken, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10,
1948, at A6, col. 3; BEGIN, supra note 14, at 162-165.
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demonstration to Jerusalem's Arabs, 20 and then killed these survivors. 21
The Haganah drove loudspeaker vans in Jerusalem announcing in Arabic,
"unless you leave your homes, the fate of Deir Yassin will be your fate. ' 22
By May, after the Jewish Agency had taken considerable territory in
Palestine, and 300,000 Arabs had fled in the face of its attacks, 2 the
Agency declared statehood for Israel.2" The Arab Higher Committee,
which represented the Palestine Arabs at the United Nations, saw this as
a violation of the rights of Palestinian inhabitants. In the Committee's
view, "the people of Palestine" were "an independent nation," while the
Jewish Agency headed "a rebellious minority which has revolted against
the sovereignty of the majority of the population of the country. 25
Transjordan and the Jewish Agency agreed that the Agency would
get the bulk of Palestine (the Mediterranean coastal area and some hin-
terland), and that Transjordan would get the West Bank of the Jordan
River. 8 When the Agency declared statehood, the Transjordanian Legion
occupied the West Bank but did not contest the Agency for the rest of
Palestine. There was no agreement about Jerusalem, however, and over
the spring and summer of 1948, the Transjordanian Legion and the Israel
Defense Force (I.D.F.) fought there. As neither side prevailed, they di-
vided the city, Israel taking the western part (by then overwhelmingly
Jewish in population because of the exodus of the Arabs), and Trans-.
jordan the eastern part (overwhelmingly Arab in population).
Count Folke Bernadotte, dispatched by the U.N. as a mediator,
urged that Israel permit the Arab refugees to return, and criticized Israel
for the seizure of real and personal property of the Arabs. 2 In Jerusalem,
three members of the Stern Gang assassinated Bernadotte, apparently in
20. HARRY LEVIN, I SAW THE BATTLE OF JERUSALEM 57 (1950).
21. MICHAEL PALUMBO, THE PALESTINIAN CATASTROPHE 52 (1987); Avi SHLAIM, COLLU-
SION ACROSS THE JORDAN: KING ABDULLAH, THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT, AND THE PARTITION OF
PALESTINE 164 (1988).
22. Erskine Childers, The Wordless Wish: From Citizens to Refugees, in THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF PALESTINE: ESSAYS ON THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI
CONFLICT 165, 186 (Ibrahim Abu-Lughod ed., 1971).
23. Michael Akehurst, The Arab-Israeli Conflict in International Law, 5 NEW ZEALAND
U. L. REV. 231, 233 (1973); CHILDERS, supra note 22, at 193. Benny Morris, The Causes and
Character of the Arab Exodus from Palestine: the Israel Defense Forces Intelligence
Branch Analysis of June 1948, 22 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 5, 10 (1986), quoting I.D.F.,
Intelligence Branch Report, The Emigration of the Arabs of Palestine in the Period 1/12/
1947 - 1/6/1948, June 30, 1948.
24. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1 Laws of the State of
Israel 3 (1948).
25. U.N. SCOR, 292d mtg. at 26-27, U. N. Doc. S/PV.292 (1948) (statement of Issa
Nakhleh, Representative, Arab Higher Committee).
26. SHLAIM, supra note 21, at 112-116. See also GOLDA MEIR, My LIFE 209 (1975); ALEC
KIRKBRIDE, FROM THE WINGS: AMMAN MEMOIRS 1947-1951 4 (1976).
27. Progress Report of the UN Mediator on Palestine, G.A. Res. 186, U.N. Doc. A/648
at 14 (1948).
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reprisal for these views.2 By late 1948 Jerusalem's pre-1948 Arab popula-
tion of 70,000 was reduced to an estimated 3,500.19
In December 1949, after it had admitted Israel to U.N. membership,
the General Assembly again proposed the internationalization of Jerusa-
lem under the U.N. Trusteeship Council.30 But neither Jordan nor Israel
showed interest.3 1
In 1950 the government of Israel made west Jerusalem its capital
city. Jordan formally incorporated the West Bank, including east Jeru-
salem, into itself."3 Jordan's parliament said, however, that it acted "with-
out prejudicing the final settlement of Palestine's just case within the
sphere of national aspirations, inter-Arab co-operation and international
justice."' Thus, Jordan recognized Palestine's right to exist that might be
effectuated at some future date.
In 1967, during a time of hostility with neighboring states, Israel cap-
tured the West Bank, including east Jerusalem. The hostilities grew out
of tension between Israel and Syria. Egypt, convinced that Israel would
attack Syria,3 5 asked the U.N. to remove its peacekeeping force from the
Israel-Egypt border so that Egypt could move against Israel "the moment
it might carry out any aggressive action against any Arab country."" U.N.
Secretary General U Thant pulled the U.N. Emergency Force (U.N.E.F.)
28. John Kifner, 2 Recount '48 Killings in Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1988, at A3, col.
1 (The Stern Gang was headed by Itzhak Shamir, a future prime minister of Israel. Shamir
denied involvement in the assassination).
29. Ian Lustick, The Quiescent Palestinians: The System of Control over Arabs in
Israel, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PALESTINIANS 64, 66 (Khalil Nakhleh & Elia Zureik eds.,
1980).
30. G.A. Res. 303, U.N. Doc. A/1251 at 25 (1949).
31. Mark I. Gruhin, Jerusalem: Legal & Political Dimensions in a Search for Peace, 12
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 169, 204 (1980); Whiteman, Corpus Separatum: Jerusalem, 1 Di-
GEST INT'L L. at 594.
32. Jerusalem Named Capital of Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1950, at Al, col. 2. Emer-
gency Regulations (Land Requisition - Accommodation of State Institutions in Jerusalem)
(Continuance in Force of Orders) Law, 4 Laws of the State of Israel 106 (1950).
33. The International Status of Palestine, 90 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 964,
980-982 (1963); Yehuda Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea
and Samaria, 3 ISRAEL L. REV. 279, 289 (1968).
34. Albion Ross, Amman Parliament Vote Unites Arab Palestine and Transjordan,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1950, at Al, col. 2.
35. DAVID KIMCHE & DAN BAWLY, THE SANDSTORM: THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR OF JUNE
1967: PRELUDE AND AFTERMATH 91 (1968); ARTHUR LALL, THE UN AND THE MIDDLE EAST
CISIS, 1967 7-8 (1968). On May 12 Prime Minister Levi Eshkol threatened Syria. Charles
W. Yost, The Arab-Israeli War: How it Began, 46 FOREIGN AFF. 304, 307 (1968); Weekly
News Bulletin (Government of Israel), May 9-15, 1967, at 20, in Amos Shaira, The Six-Day
War and the Right of Self-Defence, 6 ISRAEL L. REV. 65, 66 (1971). Syria complained to the
Security Council. U.N. SCOR 22d Sess., at 90 U.N. Doc. S/7885 (1967). (U.N. SCOR 22d
Sess. Supp. for April, May & June 1967) (letter of Syria to President of Security Council,
May 15, 1967).
36. MAi. GEN. INDAR JIT RIKHYF, THE SINAI BLUNDER: WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS EMERGENCY FORCE LEADING TO THE SIx-DAY WAR JUNE, 1967 16 (1978) (Rikhye was
the U.N. commander and received this communication from Egypt).
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out of Egypt, and asked Israel to accept the U.N.E.F. on its side of the
border as a guard against a possible attack by Egypt, but Israel
declined.3"
Egypt announced it would close the Straits of Tiran to Israeli flag
vessels, and to any vessels carrying strategic goods to Israel." Again
Egypt said it acted to prevent Israel from preparing for an attack on
Syria.3 9 Egypt moved troops to the Israel-Egypt border to deter Israel
from attacking Syria.40 The I.D.F. understood that Egypt meant to inter-
vene only if Israel attacked Syria." The United States did not expect
Egypt to attack absent an Israeli invasion of Syria, and it so informed
Israel.2 On May 30, Egypt concluded a defense treaty with Jordan.
On June 4, Israel's cabinet authorized an invasion of Egypt, 3 and the
next day Israel's air force bombed Egyptian aircraft on the ground at
their bases and attacked by land into the Sinai Peninsula." Jordan retali-
ated by shelling into Israel around Jerusalem.' In the Security Council,
the United Arab Republic charged Israel with aggression,'4 but Israel
claimed that Egypt struck first.' Israel told the Council, "Egyptian forces
engaged us by air and land, bombarding the villages of Kissufim, Nahal-
Oz and Ein Hashelosha," and "approaching Egyptian aircraft appeared
on our radar screens."'' 8 In fact Egypt did not bombard the villages, and
its aircraft did not leave their bases. In its advance against Jordanian
forces, the I.D.F. captured east Jerusalem.
On July 7 Prime Minister Levi Eshkol acknowledged that Israel
37. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS
EMERGENCY FORCE, U.N. GAOR 5th Sess. at para. 21, U.N. Doc. A/6730/Add.3 (1967).
38. Kenneth M. Lewan, Justifications for the Opening of Hostilities in the Middle
East, 26 REVUE EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 88 (1970).
39. 16 KEESING'S CONTEMP. ARCHIVES 22065 (1967).
40. Akehurst, supra note 23, at 240.
41. NADAV SAFRAN, FROM WAR TO WAR: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION, 1948-1967
307 (1969).
42. LYNDON B. JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE POINT: PERSPECTIVES OF THE PRESIDENCY 1963-
1969 293 (1971). Alfred J. Hotz, Legal Dilemmas: The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 19 S.D.L. REV.
242, 264 (1974).
43. Asher Wallfish, Meir Reveals Text of War Decision, JERUSALEM POST, June 5, 1972,
at 1, col. 2. EDGAR O'BALLANCE, THE THIRD ARAB-ISRAELI WAR 35 (1972); JANICE G. STEIN
AND RAYMOND TANTER, RATIONAL DECISION-MAKING: ISRAEL'S SECURITY CHOICES, 1967 241
(1980); Howard Koch, June 1967: The Question of Aggression, 14 ARAB WORLD 10-13 (June
1969); KIMCHE & BAWLY, supra note 35, at 156.
44. PIERRE-MAIE MARTIN, LE CONFLIT ISRARLO-ARABE: RECHERCHES SUR L'EMPLOI DE LA
FORCE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POSITIF 153-54 (1973). See generally, Tom J. Farer,
Law and War, in 3 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: CONFLICT MANAGE-
MENT 15, 41 (Cyril Black & Richard Falk eds., 1971)
45. O'BALLANCE, supra note 43, at 181.
46. U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess. 1347th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1347 (1967).
47. U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess. 1347th mtg. at 3 U.N. Doc. S/PV.1347 (1967) (communica-
tion of Israel to President of Security Council).
48. U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess. 1348th mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1348 (1967) (statement of
Foreign Minister Abba Eban, Israel).
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struck first, but said it had done so in "legitimate defense," because it
anticipated an imminent Egyptian attack.49 As proof of Egypt's intent,
Israeli officials cited Egypt's request for the departure of U.N.E.F., its
closure of the Straits of Tiran, its positioning of troops near Israel, its
alliance with Jordan, and verbal threats by Egyptian President Gamal
Abdul Nasser.50
Israeli officials said later, however, that Israel had not expected an
imminent attack."' Chief of Staff Itzhak Rabin said that "the two divi-
sions" Egypt sent to the border "would not have been enough to unleash
an offensive against Israel. He knew it and we knew it.' ' 52 Menachem Be-
gin, later as Prime Minister, said that "the Egyptian Army concentrations
in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to at-
tack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him.""3
The government moved quickly to change the status of east Jerusa-
lem. The Knesset (parliament) enacted a statute stating that "the law,
jurisdiction and administration of the state" of Israel "shall extend to any
area of Eretz Israel [the Land of Israel] designated by the Government by
order."" Using this statute, the government declared Israeli law applica-
ble to an area that included east Jerusalem, plus adjacent West Bank
territory of approximately equal size.55 The government merged the newly
enlarged east Jerusalem area with west Jerusalem. 50 This extension of ju-
49. Admission on Attack, THE TIMES (London), July 8, 1967, at 3, col. 7 (stating that
Eshkol "buried the often-repeated statement that Egyptian [air] and land forces attacked
Israel before she launched her devastating lightning offensive on June 5").
50. ALLAN GERSON, IsRAEL, THE WEST BANK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 71 (1978); 1967
U.N.Y.B. 1967, 195-196; Stephen M. Schwebel, Comment, What Weight to Conquest?, 64
AM. J. INT'L L. 344, 346 (1970); Shaira, supra note 35, at 76.
51. HEINZ WAGNER, DER ARABISCH-ISRAELISCHE KONFLIKT IM VOLKERRECHT 434 (1971);
Joseph L. Ryan, The Myth of Annihilation and the Six-Day War, WORLDVIEW, at 38-42
(Sept. 1973).
52. Le gn~ral Rabin ne pense pas que Nasser voulait la guerre, LE MONDE, Feb. 29,
1968, at 1, col. 6 (Rabin said that Nasser did not think Israel would attack Syria, but that
Nasser put troops on the border to give the appearance of being the "savior of Syria").
53. Excerpts from Begin Speech at National Defense College, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,
1982, at A6, col, 5.
54. Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment No. 11) Law, 21 Laws of the
State of Israel 75 (1967). By a simultaneous law, the Knesset gave the Minister of the Inte-
rior the right to extend the boundaries of a municipality to include the area designated by
government order issued under this amendment. Municipalities Ordinance (Amendment
No. 6) Law, 21 Laws of the State of Israel 75 (1967). By order, the Minister of the Interior
expanded the borders of east Jerusalem, KOVETZ HATAKANOT (Official Gazette), No. 2063,
June 28, 1967, at 2670.
55. KovErz HATAKANOT (Official Gazette), No. 2064, June 28, 1967, at 2690; Sabri
Jiryis, Israeli Laws as Regards Jerusalem, in THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE PALESTINE PROB-
LEM WITH SPEcIAL REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM 181, 182 (Hans Koechler ed.,
1981). See also KIMCHE & BAWLEY, supra note 35, at 215.
56. Municipalities Ordinance (Declaration on the Enlargement of Jerusalem's City
Limits), KovErz HATAKANOT (Official Gazette), No. 2065, June 28, 1967, at 2694, reprinted
in Order Unites Holy City, JERUSALEM PosT, June 29, 1967, at 1, col. 6.
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risdiction, which amounted to a de facto annexation of east Jerusalem , 7
was condemned by the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly as a
violation of the rights of the Palestine Arabs and of the law of belligerent
occupation."8 It was not recognized by other states.59
The government built large apartment complexes in east Jerusalem,
insulating it from the dense areas of Arab population. 0 This created a
Jewish-populated buffer zone between east Jerusalem and the West
Bank.61 In 1973 the Knesset made east Jerusalem residents eligible to
vote in Jerusalem municipal elections,62 but few did so, because of their
objection to Israel merging east Jerusalem with west Jerusalem.6 3
In 1980 the Knesset declared "Jerusalem, complete and united" to be
"the capital of Israel." The Knesset denominated this law a "basic law,"
giving it quasi-constitutional rank.64 The Security Council and General
Assembly declared the 1980 law a nullity.6"
In 1988 the Palestine National Council, a parliamentary body of the
Palestine Arabs, 6 laid plans to declare statehood for a Palestinian state.
Jordan renounced its 1952 incorporation of the West Bank, including east
Jerusalem, Jordan's King Hussein explaining, "We respect the wish of the
P.L.O.6 7 for an independent Palestinian state."6" The Palestine National
Council then proclaimed "the establishment of the State of Palestine in
the land of Palestine with its capital Jerusalem."6 9 The Council projected
57. GERSON, supra note 50, at 211.
58. S.C. Res. 252, 23 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decs. 9, U.N. Doc. S/INF/23/Rev.1 (1968). S.
C. Res. 267, 24 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decs. 3, U.N. Doc. S/INF/24/Rev.1 (1969). G.A. Res.
2253, 5 (emerg. spec. sess.) U.N. GAOR Res. 4, U.N. Doc. A/6798 (1967).
59. JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 11i-115 (1987); Antonio Cas-
sese, Legal Considerations on the International Status of Jerusalem, 3 PALESTINE Y.B.
INT'L L. 13, 28-32 (1986).
60. Sarah Graham-Brown, The Economic Consequences of the Occupation, in OCCUPA-
TION: ISRAEL OVER PALESTINE 167, 205 (Naseer Aruri ed., 1983).
61. RAFIK HALABI, THE WEST BANK STORY 42 (1982); W. THOMAS MALLISON & SALLY V.
MALLISON, THE PALESTINE PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 234 (1986).
62. Local Authorities (Elections)(Amendment No. 6) Law, 27 Laws of the State of
Israel 170 (1973).
63. ORI STENDEL, THE MINORITIES IN ISRAEL 135-136 (1973). Henry Kamm, Most Arabs
Boycott Jerusalem Election, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1974, at A2, col. 4.
64. Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 34 Laws of the State of Israel 209 (1980).
65. S.C. Res. 478, 35 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decs. 14, U.N. Doc. S/INF/36 (1981). G.A. Res.
35/169(E), 35 U.N. GAOR Res. & Decs. 28, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1981).
66. Members are selected by Palestine Arab communities and organizations. DAVID GIL-
MOUR, DISPOSSESSED: THE ORDEAL OF THE PALESTINIANS 156 (1982).
67. Palestine Liberation Organization, an administrative-executive body operating
under the authority of the Palestine National Council.
68. John Kifner, Hussein Surrenders Claims on West Bank to the P.L.O., N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 1988, at Al, col. 6.
69. Palestine National Council, Declaration of Independence, Nov. 15, 1988, U.N.
GAOR, 43d Sess., Annex 3, Agenda Item 37 at 15, U.N. Doc. A/43/827, S/20278 (1988),
reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1668 (1988); Al-Fajr Jerusalem Palestinian Weekly, Nov. 28, 1988,
at 5, col. 1 (official English translation).
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its state for the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including east Jerusa-
lem." Thus, the reference to Jerusalem as capital was to east Jerusalem.
In 1990 large numbers of Jews from the Soviet Union began to immi-
grate to Israel, and the government announced plans to build new hous-
ing for them. Substantial numbers settled in east Jerusalem. 71 U.S. Presi-
dent George Bush said that Israel should create no "new settlements" in
east Jerusalem. 2 The State Department reaffirmed its position that east
Jerusalem was part of the West Bank, not of Israel.7 This new settlement
activity concerned east Jerusalem's Palestine Arabs, who feared that it
would solidify Israel's hold.74 A statement by Simcha Dinitz, head of the
Jewish Agency which organizes and finances Jewish immigration to
Israel, 75 fed these fears. Dinitz said that the Soviet immigrants would
"give Israel the numbers it needs to go to the negotiating table from a
position of strength."7 " The statement suggested that the immigration
would help Israel resist demands for the establishment of a Palestine
state.
The United States promised Israel a $400 million loan to build hous-
ing for Soviet Jews but demanded an assurance that Israel would not set-
tle the immigrants in east Jerusalem, or elsewhere in the West Bank. Af-
ter several months of negotiations, Israel refused to give the assurances,
but the United States still released the $400 million.77
In October 1990 a shooting incident occurred in east Jerusalem near
70. See Letter dated November 16, 1988 from the Deputy Permanent Observer of the
Palestine Liberation Organization to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary Gen-
eral, U.N. GAOR 43d Sess., Annex 2 Agenda Item 37 at 7, U.N. Doc. A/43/827, S/29278
(1988).
71. Herb Keinon & Walter Ruby, Warsaw Now Transit Point for Soviets, JERUSALEM
POST (int'l ed.), June 9, 1990, at 3, col. 1 (U.S. Reps. William Lehman and Peter Defazio
reporting statements by Israeli officials that 1400 had settled in and around east Jerusalem
from mid-1989 to mid-1990).
72. Excerpts of President Bush's Remarks at News Conference at End of Talks, N.Y.
TimEs, Mar. 4, 1990, at A22, col. 1. See also Thomas Friedman, Bush Questions Israeli
Claims to East Jerusalem, Creating Uproar, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1990, at A8, col. 3.
73. Joel Brinkley, Labor Party Rejects Likud Terms for Palestinian Talks, N.Y.
TimEs, Mar. 6, 1990, at A3, col. 3 (statement of Margaret Tutwiler, spokesperson).
74. PLO Radio Broadcasts Intifadah Call No. 58, British Broadcasting Corp., Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts, June 18, 1990, pt. 4, at ME/0793/A/1 (quoting text of Call No. 58
issued by Unified National Leadership of the Uprising).
75. Herb Keinon & Eitan Milgram, Cabinet Gives Sharon Emergency Powers, JERUSA-
LEM POST (int'l ed.), July 7, 1990, at 1, col. 1 (Jewish Agency agreed to pay $362 million over
three years to absorb new immigrants); Garry Abrams, Homeward Bound: Operation Exo-
dus Lends Support to Soviet Jews in Their Return to Israel, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 1990, at
El, col. 2 (Mendel Kaplan, Chairman, Jewish Agency Board of Governors, saying that the
Agency provides all transportation cost to Israel for Soviet immigrants plus total living ex-
penses for their first six months).
76. Herb Keinon, Finland Gives Go-ahead to Fly Jews to Israel, JERUSALEM POST (int'l
ed.), July 14, 1990, at 3, col. 2.
77. Allison Kaplan, Alisa Odenheimer & David Makovsky, U.S. Gave Loan Guarantees
Without the Facts It Sought, JERUSALEM POST (int'l ed.), Mar. 2, 1991, at 1, col. 4.
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the Al-Aqsa mosque, in which Israeli police killed seventeen Palestine
Arabs. The U.N. Security Council condemned the killings and asked the
Secretary General to report on appropriate measures to be taken. It reaf-
firmed, as the basis for international action, its previous position that east
Jerusalem was under belligerent occupation. 8
Israel rejected the resolution on the grounds that east Jerusalem was
under its sovereignty and therefore rules of belligerent occupation did not
apply. It also refused admission to a team the Secretary General wanted
to send to investigate. It explained to the Secretary General, "Jerusalem
is not, in any part, 'occupied territory;' it is the sovereign capital of the
State of Israel. Therefore, there is no room for any involvement on the
part of the United Nations in any matter relating to Jerusalem. '79 Thus,
Israel's positiop was that east Jerusalem was territory under Israel's
sovereignty.
The Council adopted a follow-up resolution, "expressing alarm" at
Israel's rejection of the previous resolution. The Secretary General is-
sued his report, without being able to conduct an on-site inquiry, and
proposed a permanent U.N. role to monitor Israel's treatment of the Pal-
estine Arabs in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, including east
Jerusalem. 1
II. SELF-DETERMINATION
In the twentieth century, a new norm has emerged in international
law that is relevant to the status of Jerusalem. The concept of self-deter-
mination gave a people under foreign control a right to decide its political
destiny. Self-determination found its first manifestation in the mandate
system established by the League of Nations after World War I. The
League's Covenant required the states that took territory in World War I
to promote the well-being of its people as a "sacred trust of
civilization. "82
The mandate system was directly relevant for Jerusalem because the
League gave Great Britain a mandate to administer Palestine. The
League made the mandate of the "Class A" variety, meaning that Pales-
tine was provisionally recognized as independent.8 3 At the same time, the
78. S.C. Res. 672, U.N. Doc. SIRES/672 (1990), reprinted in Text of Resolution
Adopted by U.N. Council, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1990, at A10, col. 2.
79. David Makovsky, Israel Won't Cooperate with UN Envoys, JERUSALEM POST (int'l
ed.), week ending Oct. 20, 1990, at 1, col. 5. See also Shamir statement quoted in Report
Submitted to the Security Council by the Secretary-General in Accordance with Resolu-
tion 672, U.N. Doc. S/21919 at 3 (1990), reprinted in AL-FAJM JERUSALEM PALESTINIAN
WEEKLY, Nov. 12, 1990, at 8, col. 1, excerpted in Report by U.N. on Arabs, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 1990, at A10, col. 1.
80. U.N. SCOR (2949th mtg.) U.N. Doc. S/RES/673 (1990), reprinted in U.N. Resolu-
tion on Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 26, 1990, at All, col. 1.
81. Report Submitted to the Security Council, supra note 79, at 3-5.
82. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, 1.
83. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, T 4.
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League acknowledged Britain's commitment to promote the development
of a Jewish national home in Palestine, a fact that clouded the scope of
Britain's obligation to promote independence. 4
Self-determination received more thorough treatment in the United
Nations Charter, which stated that the organization would "develop
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples."8 Some commentators
concluded from the drafting history that this concept lacked normative
force. One argued that the Charter "acknowledge[d] the right of colonial
States to continue administering the non-self-governing territories," and
that it did not make self-determination a norm of law. 6
Although the U.N. Charter did not call for immediate termination of
colonialism, it required member states to regard their control over colo-
nies as a "sacred trust" and to transmit periodic reports regarding their
administration of them to the United Nations.87 It thus extended to all
administering states the obligations that under the League Covenant had
applied to states administering mandate territories.
The Charter referred to self-determination as a "principle" in the
Chinese, Spanish, English, and Russian texts.88 Some commentators ar-
gued that "principle" was less than a "right." One said that self-determi-
nation is an aspiration of the United Nations but "can hardly be regarded
as an absolute, either in international law or in international politics."88
But the French text, instead of "principle," said "right" (droit
d'auto-d~termination)." Treaty texts that vary in different official lan-
guages must be reconciled if possible. "Principle" can mean legal enti-
tlement, or something less. Since "principle" is ambiguous, it must be
read to mean "right."8 2
84. Mandate for Palestine, art. 2, 8 LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 0. J. 1007 (1922), See also
TERMS OF LEAGUE OF NATIONS MANDATES: REPUBLISHED BY THE UNITED NATIONS, U.N. Doc.
A/70 (1946), reprinted from Permanent Mandates Commission No. 466, League of Nations
Doc. C.529 M.314 1922 VI and C.667 M.396 1922.VI. See also Convention between the
United States and Great Britain Concerning Palestine, Dec. 3, 1924, 44 Stat. 2184.
85. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 2.
86. NATHAN FEINBERG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 462 (1979).
87. U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
88. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
89. Eugene V. Rostow, Palestinian Self-Determination: Possible Futures for the Unal-
located Territories of the Palestine Mandate, 5 YALE J. WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 147, 154
(1979). See also, Note, Palestinian Arab Self-Determination and Israeli Settlements on the
West Bank: An Analysis of Their Legality Under International Law, 8 Lov. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 551, 555 (1986).
90. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 2.
91. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 33, V 3, opened for signature May
23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875, 886 (1969), re-
printed in 8 I. L. M. 679, 693 (1969) (treaty terms are presumed to have the same meaning
in each official language).
92. "Principle" is often used in a normative sense in treaties. See, e.g., Wolfgang
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The International Court of Justice has found the Charter provision
on self-determination to import legal entitlement. In a 1971 case concern-
ing Namibia, which, like Palestine, had been under a League of Nations
mandate, the Court explained that the League Covenant gave a right of
self-determination to peoples under mandates, and that the U.N. Charter
expanded this right to peoples of all non-self-governing territories.93 The
General Assembly referred to self-determination, as found in the Charter,
as a right.9 '
The existence by 1947 of a right to self-determination meant that as
Britain announced its intent to withdraw, the people of Palestine had a
right to statehood. By that time Britain and France, the two states that
held mandate territory in the region, had given independence to the other
mandate territories - Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. The people of Palestine
- Arabs with a Jewish minority - were similarly entitled to indepen-
dence. When the Jewish Agency tried by force to prevent them from
achieving statehood, the Palestine Arabs, as the putative sovereign, could
lawfully defend themselves.9
III. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF JERUSALEM
The U.N. General Assembly proposed to treat Jerusalem separately
from the rest of Palestine. In proposing a partition of Palestine, as indi-
cated, the Assembly called for Jerusalem to be a "corpus separatum" be-
tween a Jewish state and an Arab state.96
However, the resolution was only a recommendation and was never
put into effect. The resolution said that the Assembly "considers that the
present situation in Palestine is one which is likely to impair the general
Benedek, Progressive Development of the Principles and Norms of International Law Re-
lating to the NIEO: The UNITAR Exercise, 36 OSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR OFFEN-
TLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT, 289, 307-311 (1986). The use of "principle" elsewhere in
the Charter indicated that the Charter drafters used it in a normative sense. See, e.g., U.N.
CHARTER art. 2, para.4 (provision designated as a "principle" prohibiting use of force be-
tween states).
93. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J.
16, 31.
94. G.A. Res. 421 V (D), 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 43, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950),
Vote: 30-9-13 (referring to "ways and means which would ensure the right of peoples and
nations to self-determination"). See also G.A. Res. 545 VI, 6 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at
36-37, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1952), Vote (on quoted paragraph): 40-4-10 (referring to Resolu-
tion 421(D) by saying that there the Assembly "recognized the right of peoples and nations
to self-determination as a fundamental human right"). The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, which, according to its preamble, is based on the Charter, defines self-
determination as a right. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1., Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
95. DEREK BowE'rr, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 56 (1958). See generally
Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1626 (1984).
96. G.A. Res. 181, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/519, at 146 (1947).
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welfare and friendly relations among nations. '97 The phrases "general
welfare" and "friendly relations" are drawn from a Charter provision that
gives the Assembly the power of recommendation." This indicated that
the Assembly, in keeping with its powers, understood that it was making
only a non-binding recommendation.
Member states understood that the resolution was only a recommen-
dation.'9 Britain told the Security Council that it would not implement
partition so long as Arab or Jewish authorities objected.100 The United
States said that the resolution carried only "moral force."101 When it be-
came clear that the resolution would not be implemented, the United
States suggested the possibility of a temporary U.N. trusteeship over Pal-
estine. 10 2 The Council asked the Assembly to explore solutions other than
partition, but the Assembly had no success.103
As for Jerusalem, after the partition idea failed, the General Assem-
bly reiterated its call for internationalization.1 04 Although the city was
never internationalized, its status was never resolved. Though various na-
tions recognized Israel as a state, they did not recognize Israeli sover-
eignty over west Jerusalem."° ' In explanation, the United States and
others cited the General Assembly resolutions proposing an international
status for Jerusalem.1 06 Few states located embassies in west Jerusalem,
placing them instead in Tel Aviv.1 0 7 After more than four decades of Is-
raeli de facto control of west Jerusalem, most states continue to consider
the status of Jerusalem (east and west) to be unresolved.
97. Id. at 131.
98. U.N. CHARTER art. 14.
99. HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS FUN-
DAMENTAL PROBLEMS 195 (1950).
100. 3 U.N. SCOR (253d mtg.) at 271-272, (1948) (statement of Mr. Creech Jones,
U.K.).
101. 3 U.N. SCOR (253d mtg.) at 265, (1948)(statement of Mr. Austin, U.S.), reprinted
in 18 DEPT. ST. BULL. 294 (1948).
102. 5 Foreign Rel. U.S. 1948 801 (1976), 3 U.N. SCOR (271st mtg.), at 31-32 (1948);
Declaration by Austin on Palestine Situation in the Security Council, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,
1948, at A2, col. 3.
103. S.C. Res. 44, 3 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decs. 16 (1948).
104. G.A. Res. 194, U.N. GAOR Res. at 21, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); G.A. Res. 303, U.N.
GAOR Res. at 25, U.N. Doc. A/1251 (1949). Gruhin, supra note 31, at 204-205.
105. G.I.A.D. Draper, The Status of Jerusalem as a Question of International Law, in
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE PALESTINE PROBLEM, supra note 55, at 154, 160.
106. Harry Howard, The Development of United States Policy in the Near East,
South Asia, and Africa During 1953: Part II, 30 DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan. 4 - June 28, 1954, at
328, 329; Corpus Separatum: Jerusalem, supra note 31, at 595, The International Status of
Palestine, supra note 33, at 976; Shlomo Slonim, The United States and the Status of
Jerusalem 1947-1984, 19 ISRAL L. REV. 179-252 (1984).
107. Antonio Cassese, Legal Considerations on the International Status of Jerusalem,
in THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE PALESTINE PROBLEM, supra note 55, at 144, 148-149. See also
Corpus Separatum: Jerusalem, supra note 31, at 595.
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IV. EAST JERUSALEM AND THE USE OF FORCE
To justify Israel's 1967 extension of jurisdiction over east Jerusa-
lem,108 Prime Minister Eshkol said that "Israel without Jerusalem is
Israel without a head."'0 9 But the 1967 legislation and decree did not
claim sovereignty. In a letter to the Secretary-General at the time, For-
eign Minister Abba Eban said, "The measures adopted relate to the inte-
gration of Jerusalem in the administrative and municipal spheres, and
furnish a legal basis for the protection of the Holy Places of Jerusa-
lem.'" ° He said that the term "annexation," which was being used at the
U.N. to criticize the measures, was "out of place." The government ar-
gued that the 1967 action was not an annexation and therefore did not
violate the law of belligerent occupation."
Eban's argument was weak, because there was no need to apply Is-
raeli law to protect the holy sites. This could have been done just as eas-
ily by applying Jordanian law, which Israel applied elsewhere in the West
Bank. Further, the law of belligerent occupation precludes the annexation
of occupied territory and, short of annexation, forbids the substitution of
the occupier's law for the law previously in force."'
Gradually the government moved closer to claiming sovereignty over
east Jerusalem. The 1980 statute stating that Jerusalem (both halves) was
the capital of Israel implied a claim of sovereignty over east Jerusalem. '"
While the statute did not mention sovereignty directly, if a state claims a
territory as part of its capital city, it must be claiming sovereignty. In
1990, during the controversy over the U.N. investigation of the AI-Aqsa
mosque killings, the government explicitly asserted sovereignty over east
Jerusalem.""
Israel claimed that its control of east Jerusalem, like its control of
the entire West Bank, was legally justified. It argued that it took the
West Bank, including east Jerusalem, by using force in self-defense.
Thus, Elihu Lauterpacht wrote:
Territorial change cannot properly take place as a result of the unlaw-
ful use of force. But to omit the word 'unlawful' is to change the sub-
stantive content of the rule and to turn an important safeguard of
108. See supra notes 54-57.
109. 'Israel without a Head', N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1967, at A16, col. 1.
110. Measures Taken by Israel to Change the Status of the City of Jerusalem, Report
of the Secretary-General, July 10, 1967, U.N. Doc. A/6753 at 3, reprinted in 6 I. L. M. 846,
848 (1967) (giving text of letter by Minister of Foreign Affairs Abba Eban).
111. ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, JERUSALEM AND THE HOLY PLACES 50 (1968).
112. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, An-
nex: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 43, 36 Stat. 2277,
2306 (1907); see also Bevans, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949 631 (1968); Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 64, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, at 328 (1950).
113. See supra note 64.
114. Report Submitted to the Security Council, supra note 79, at 5.
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legal principle into an aggressor's charter. For if force can never be
used to effect lawful territorial change, then, if territory has once
changed hands as a result of an unlawful use of force, the illegitimacy
of the position thus established is sterilized by the prohibition upon
the use of force to restore the lawful sovereign. This cannot be re-
garded as correct or reasonable.115
Lauterpacht's argument confused two separate situations. The first is
aggression by State A against State B, where State B in defending itself
enters the territory of State A and remains there. In this situation, State
B may remain only so long as is necessary to repel the attack initiated by
State A. The second is aggression by State A against State B, where State
A enters and occupies territory in State B. The question becomes whether
State B may initiate new hostilities to drive State A out of its territory.
Opinion on this issue is divided, but on the first question it is uniform, to
the effect that State B may use only such force as is necessary to repel
State A's attack and may remain in occupation only so long as is neces-
sary to ensure that State A will not resume its attack.
A state that takes territory while acting in self-defense is obliged to
withdraw once it has protected itself from the danger.11 It may not retain
territory it takes while repelling an attack. If Israel had acted in self-
defense, that would not justify its retention of the West Bank.117 Under
the United Nations Charter, there can lawfully be no territorial gains
from war, even by a state acting in self-defense.' The response of other
states to Israel's occupation showed a virtually unanimous opinion that
even if Israel's action was defensive, its retention of the West Bank was
not justified.1 9
Lauterpacht's argument was premised on the assumption that Israel
acted in self-defense in 1967. As indicated above, however, Israel did not
think that Egypt was about to attack.12 0 Even if Israel was concerned that
Egypt might attack at some future time, preemptive strikes are not per-
mitted under the United Nations Charter."1 The Charter characterizes
armed force as defensive only if it is used in response to an "armed at-
115. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 111, at 52. See also MARTIN, supra note 44, at 261-265
(arguing that Israel may retain the territories it took in 1967, on the theory that it took
them defensively).
116. JENNINGS, supra note 5, at 55-56.
117. J.R. GAINSBOROUGH, THE ARAB-IsRAELI CONFLICT: A POLITICO-LEGAL ANALYSIS 149,
158 (1986); MALLISON & MALLISON, supra note 61, at 259.
118. Quincy Wright, The Palestine Conflict in International Law, in MAJOR MIDDLE
EAST PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 13, 27 (M. Khadduri ed., 1972); Quincy Wright, The
Middle East Problem, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 270 (1970).
119. S.C. Res. 476, 35 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decs. 13, U.N. Doc. S/INF/36 (1980);
DUGARD, supra note 59, at 113; Munkman, Review of Jerusalem and the Holy Places (Elihu
Lauterpacht), 43 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 306, 310 (1968-69).
120. See supra notes 51-53.
121. Akehurst, supra note 23, at 241. See also John L. Hargrove, Abating the Middle




tack.' 1 22 "Armed attack" means that an attack must actually be in pro-
gress, or so near that the reality of the attack is evident.
Although neither the General Assembly nor the Security Council ever
adopted a resolution on the responsibility for the June 1967 hostilities,
both have called on Israel to withdraw from the territory it occupied.12
Regardless of who was responsible for the 1967 hostilities, Israel is pre-
cluded from retaining the territory it took.
Another thesis put forward to justify Israel's retention of the West
Bank, including east Jerusalem, was that Israel's taking of it was neces-
sary and proportional in relation to its security needs, and that this ne-
cessity did not immediately subside.2 4 But even if Israel had responded
to an imminent attack in 1967, it quickly eliminated any threat to itself.
At that point its defensive right would have ceased, and it would have
been obligated to withdraw.
25
Some analysts asserted that Israel might retain the West Bank, in-
cluding east Jerusalem, pending a peace agreement between itself and the
Arab states. 26 Others argued that it might lawfully retain them perma-
nently, because Jordan had not held lawful title and therefore that there
was no sovereign to whom the territories could revert. Israel, it was said,
particularly because it took the territories defensively, had a better claim
to title than anyone else."'7 That argument ignored, however, the gener-
ally recognized proposition that uncertainty over sovereignty provides no
ground to retain territory taken in hostilities. Even if Jordan held the
West Bank on only a de facto basis, Israel could not, even acting in self-
defense, acquire title. 28 The argument also overlooked the fact that the
Palestine Arabs collectivity had a sound claim to the West Bank on the
basis of their right of self-determination.
Israel's claim of self-defense was false. Jordan's responsive military
action against Israel was lawful, as collective self-defense under U.N.
Charter Article 51.1" Israel's use of force against Jordan was part of its
aggression against Egypt, and was therefore unlawful. This means that
Israel took east Jerusalem through aggression. Under the U.N. Charter,
122. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
123. S.C. Res. 242, 22 U.N. SCOR Res. 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/Rev.2 (1967); S.C. Res.
476, 35 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decs. 13, U.N. Doc. S/INF/36 (1980); G.A. Res. 3414, Dec. 5,
1975, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
124. John Norton Moore, The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Obligation to Pursue
Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, 19 KAN. L. REv. 403, 425 (1971).
125. Hargrove, supra note 121, at 367.
126. Akehurst, supra note 23, at 242.
127. Yehuda Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and
Samaria, 3 ISRAEL L. REv. 279, 294 (1968); Schwebel, supra note 50, at 346; Stephen Schwe-
bel, Remarks, 1 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 374 (1971); JULIUS STONE, ISRAEL AND PAL-
ESTINE: ASSAULT ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 52 (1981).
128. Cassese, supra note 59, at 24.
129. See supra note 45. See also O'Brien, International Law and the Outbreak of War
in the Middle East, 1967, 11 OPRis 692, 703 (1967).
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territory may not be taken by aggression, and once taken must be
returned.'
Hostilities between Jordan and Israel resulted from Israel's attack on
Egypt, with whom Jordan had a defensive alliance. Israel's attack on
Egypt in June 1967 constituted aggression, and Jordan's participation on
Egypt's side was justified as collective self-defense.' 3 ' Therefore, Israel's
military action against Jordan, during which it took east Jerusalem, con-
stituted aggression.
One other argument has been made to justify Israeli sovereignty in
east Jerusalem. It relies on the General Assembly's 1947 resolution on
partition and on the resolution's provision for the internationalization of
Jerusalem. Since internationalization was not effected, the argument
runs, Jerusalem became open to occupation by whichever of the benefi-
ciaries of the 1947 resolution might do so. Thus, Jerusalem was legally
open to occupation by Israel, which it occupied in 1967.12 This argument
is defective, however, because the 1947 resolution, as indicated above, was
merely a recommendation and, since it was not accepted, it created no
rights.' In addition, the self-determination right of the Palestine Arabs
meant that east Jerusalem could not be considered open to occupation by
Israel.
V. SETTLEMENT IN EAST JERUSALEM
The West Bank, including east Jerusalem, is under Israel's belliger-
ent occupation. This is so because Israel came into control through inter-
national hostilities. The government of Israel acknowledges that it holds
the West Bank under belligerent occupation but does not acknowledge
that status for east Jerusalem. Israel treats the two territories differently
under its legislation. East Jerusalem is part of Israel administratively; it
is governed by a city administration for all of Jerusalem. For the remain-
der of the West Bank, however, Israel has established a military govern-
ment that is the executive and legislative authority. Whereas east Jerusa-
lem is policed by Israeli police, the remainder of the West Bank is policed
by the Israel Defense Force.
The applicable law differs as well. For example, Israel's penal code is
used in east Jerusalem, and crimes are prosecuted in ordinary Israeli
courts. For the West Bank (outside east Jerusalem), on the other hand,
Israel uses the law in force at the commencement of the occupation,
namely, the law of Jordan, supplemented by military decrees issued by
Israel's military government. Most serious crime is prosecuted in Israel's
courts-martial, although some is handled, as are civil matters, in
Jordanian courts. Israel's Supreme Court uses the law of belligerent occu-
130. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4.
131. Supra note 122.
132. Gruhin, supra note 31, at 206-207.
133. See supra notes 97-103.
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pation in resolving controversies between the military government and
Palestine Arab residents of the West Bank."3 4
For east Jerusalem, as indicated, the Knesset has authorized resi-
dents to vote in municipal, though not in national elections. 38 The gov-
ernment of Israel issued identity cards to east Jerusalem residents, but
they have in the main retained their Jordanian citizenship, and Israel has
never considered them to be citizens of Israel.
Israel's view on the status of east Jerusalem has been rejected by all
other states that have expressed a view on the issue. 3 ' They do not find
Israel authorized to apply its own law in east Jerusalem. Nor do they find
Israel authorized to settle its own citizens there.3 7 East Jerusalem is
under belligerent occupation, and the law of belligerent occupation for-
bids an occupier to transfer its own population into the occupied terri-
tory.138 This is a manifestation of the more general norm that an occupier
may not change the character of the occupied territory. 3 ' Israel has en-
couraged its citizens to settle in east Jerusalem, in particular by building
apartment complexes there, and this activity increased in 1990 with the
arrival of the Soviet immigrants.
40
Settlement involves a major change in the character of occupied ter-
ritory. An occupier is required to preserve the territory intact pending
return of the territory. If it inserts its own population into the territory
and if that new population views itself as permanent, as is the case with
the Israeli settlers in east Jerusalem, the likelihood that the territory will
be returned is substantially reduced. Further, the insertion of the occu-
pant's population violates the rights of the inhabitants if their land is
taken, as it typically is, in order to provide space for the settlers.'4
The 1967 and 1980 statutes asserting an Israeli claim to east Jerusa-
lem are irrelevant in this regard. Whatever status east Jerusalem occupies
134. RAJA SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER'S LAW: ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK 76-102 (1985). The
Court, like Israel's government, does not acknowledge the applicability of the Geneva Civil-
ians Convention, on the theory that the West Bank was not under Jordan's sovereignty
prior to 1967, but they do acknowledge the applicability of customary humanitarian law.
Their view regarding the Geneva Civilians Convention is rejected by scholars and by other
states. MALLISON & MALLISON, supra note 61, at 252-262; Jordan Paust, Gerhard von Glahn
& GOnter Woratsch, Report of the ICJ Mission of Inquiry into the Israeli Military Court
System in the Occupied West Bank and Gaza, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & Comp. L. REV. 1, 7
(1990).
135. See supra note 62.
136. S.C. Res. 478, 35 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decs. 14, U.N. Doc. SiINF/36 (1981). G.A.
Res. 35/169(E), 35 U.N. GAOR Res. & Decs. 28, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1981).
137. S.C. Res. 452, 34 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decs., U.N. Doc. S/INF/35 (1980) (calling on
Israel to cease the establishment of settlements "in the Arab territories occupied since 1967,
including Jerusalem").
138. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, Occupied Territories, art. 49, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (1950).
139. Supra note 112, art. 43.
140. See supra notes 60-61, 71.
141. MALLISON & MALLISON, supra note 61, at 262.
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as a matter of Israeli law, it is territory under belligerent occupation from
the standpoint of international law. A belligerent occupant may not en-
courage its citizens to settle in occupied territory. Moreover, the settle-
ment activity has potentially grave consequences for resolution of sover-
eignty in east Jerusalem.
VI. SOVEREIGNTY OVER EAST JERSUSALEM
Sovereignty in east Jerusalem belongs to its original inhabitants, on
the basis of their long-time occupation. 14 2 The seizure of east Jerusalem
in 1967 cannot defeat that right. The right of east Jerusalem's inhabitants
is based on self-determination, which is assertable against any belligerent
occupier, regardless of how it came into occupation.
The Palestine Arabs have a right to statehood in accordance with the
Declaration of Independence of 1988. That right is valid for the territory
contemplated for the Palestine state, namely, the Gaza Strip and the
West Bank, including east Jerusalem. This conclusion finds ample basis
in the international-legal principles relating to sovereignty over territory,
principles that include self-determination and non-aggression. East Jeru-
salem is part of the territory in which the people of Palestine are entitled
to exercise their right of self-determination by establishing a state.
The arguments that have been made by the government of Israel in
support of its continuing control of east Jerusalem are weak. Territory
taken during hostilities does not thereby fall under the sovereignty of its
occupier. Israel cannot claim east Jerusalem on the grounds that no other
state has a stronger claim, as the Palestine Arabs clearly have a strong
claim. Nor can Israel claim east Jerusalem on grounds of Israel's security.
That is simply not a basis for a claim to territory.
The status of east Jerusalem should be resolved as part of an overall
resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. East Jerusalem, or Jerusalem
as a whole, cannot be considered in isolation from the surrounding
territory.
The right of a people to achieve self-determination, or to oust an ag-
gressor from its territory, may be realized by armed force if other avenues
are exhausted. The Security Council's practice in cases involving use of
force by liberation movements in Africa during the 1970s and 1980s sug-
gests that when all else fails a people denied self-determination may re-
sort to forcible self-help to remove from its territory the state that is
holding it in dependence.14 s In an International Court of Justice case in-
volving Namibia, Judge Fouad Ammoun shared that view. Citing the
142. John Quigley, Palestine's Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination and
the Right of the Palestinians to Statehood, 7 B.U. INT'L L. J. 1 (1989).
143. Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1,
36 (1972). See also S.C. Res. 268, 24 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decs. 7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/24/Rev.1




French national movement under Nazi German occupation, and the Po-
lish, Czech, and Slovak peoples under the Austro-Hungarian Empire, he
said that a people has a right to armed struggle to achieve self-determina-
tion. "In law, the legitimacy of the peoples' struggle cannot be in any
doubt," he said, "for it follows from the right of self-defence, inherent in
human nature, which is confirmed by Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter." '
Armed force, however, is not an optimal means or a solution of first
use. It is a last resort. The international community, as required by the
U.N. Charter,"" should assist the Palestine Arabs in achieving self-deter-
mination by peaceful means.
VII. AN INTERNATIONAL ROLE IN EAST JERUSALEM
Pending a settlement of east Jerusalem's status, the fact that the
Palestine Arabs' sovereignty right remains to be effectuated has impor-
tant immediate consequences. At present, east Jerusalem, along with the
rest of the West Bank, is non-self-governing. Under the U.N. Charter, the
United Nations has oversight powers to determine whether states ad-
ministering non-self-governing territories are fulfilling their responsibili-
ties to the inhabitants. 4 6 The General Assembly has never analyzed east
Jerusalem (or the West Bank) from this standpoint, probably because the
notion of non-self-governing territories was developed for classic overseas
colonies. However, a territory under a long-term belligerent occupation is
not self-governing, and therefore falls within the non-self-governing cate-
gory. The U.N. Charter requires an administering state to report regu-
larly on the status of the territory and to promote self-government and
free political institutions." 7
Further, east Jerusalem remains an area under belligerent occupa-
tion, since it was taken by Israel during international hostilities. On this
basis as well the international community has a legitimate role. The Ge-
neva Civilians Convention regulates belligerent occupation and requires
all parties to ensure respect for the Convention whenever and wherever it
is applicable; 165 states are parties." 8 Thus, all these states are under an
obligation to ensure that Israel does not settle its citizens in east Jerusa-
lem, or physically abuse residents.
The Security Council has responsibility under the U.N. Charter for
situations of breach of the peace, and hostilities led to Israel's control
over east Jerusalem." 9 Following the October 1990 shooting incident near
the Al-Aqsa mosque, the Security Council viewed a videotape taken by a
144. Supra note 93, at 70 (separate opinion).
145. U.N. CHARTER art. 1., 1 2.
146. U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
147. U.N. CHARTER art. 73(e).
148. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, General Provisions, art. 1, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (1950).
149. U.N. CHARTER chap. 7.
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Palestine Arab bystander and concluded that Israeli police had shot and
killed Palestine Arabs without justification. As indicated, it condemned
the shooting and asked the Secretary General to report on the incident.
150
The Security Council has jurisdiction to deal both with the day-to-
day situation in east Jerusalem and with proposals for a permanent set-
tlement. Its powers, as demonstrated in the Security Council's 1990-91
action in the Persian Gulf, are extensive. 51 The Security Council may use
economic sanctions and, if those were insufficient, military force, to effect
a settlement. The Security Council has every ground for using these pow-
ers to force Israel to withdraw from east Jerusalem.
1 5 2
On the several indicated bases there exist ample reasons for a strong
international role in east Jerusalem. The status of east Jerusalem is likely
to continue to be a source of contention. The international community
bears a responsibility to monitor developments there and to promote a
solution consistent with the legitimate claims of the contending parties.
From the standpoint of territorial right, as this notion is understood in
international law, the Palestine Arabs have a valid claim to east Jerusa-
lem. That does not mean they could not agree to a settlement whereby
the city would be internationalized, or whereby Jerusalem in its entirety
was controlled jointly by Israel and a Palestine state. 5 3 But no territorial
settlement for east Jerusalem can be imposed against their will.
The Security Council and outside states must, however, be guided in
the proposals they make by a consideration of the legal rights of the par-
ties. If the United Nations or any other proponent of a settlement departs
too drastically from legal entitlement, it runs the risk of a settlement that
will not last. Legitimate grievances may be swept under a rug tempora-
rily, but they have a way of seeping out. Any solution for east Jerusalem
that does not recognize the right of the Palestine Arabs would be fraught
with danger.
150. Supra note 78.
151. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).
152. MALLISON & MALLISON, supra note 61, at 239 (pointing out that the failure of the
Council to utilize these powers quickly after 1967 permitted Israel to solidify its control in
east Jerusalem).
153. See, e.g., John V. Whitbeck, Two States, One Holy Land: A Framework for Peace,
MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, June 14, 1991, at 18 (proposing Jerusalem as a joint capital of
Israel and Palestine).
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